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When Quacking Like a Duck Is 
Really a Swan Song in Disguise: 
How Windsor’s State Powers 
Analysis Sets the Stage for the 
Demise of Federalism-Based 
Marriage Discrimination  
Nancy C. Marcus† 
Abstract 
United States v. Windsor may, in the views of some, walk and 
talk like a federalist duck, but upon closer examination, the decision 
is not a federalist decision at all but is, rather, a swan song for 
federalist-based marriage discrimination. 
Leading up to Windsor, federalist-based arguments for marriage 
equality were advocated by the late twentieth-century minimalist 
movement, which viewed the judiciary as an ineffective agent of social 
change and urged the narrowest of constitutional claims, pessimistic 
about the likelihood of successful broad individual rights claims to 
same-sex marriage rights. After Windsor’s release, some have 
interpreted it as being a federalist decision, due in part to the 
opinion’s inclusion of a state powers discussion. 
This Article describes both how backlash-fearing minimalists were 
wrong and how those who read Windsor as a federalist decision are 
wrong. The Article details an evolution in LGBT rights advocacy 
from backlash-fearing minimalism to a renewed faith in the courts 
serving an important role in the protection of constitutional rights. 
Finally, the Article offers alternative readings of Windsor’s state 
powers discussion in light of the passage’s surrounding language, 
including the Court’s pointed invocation of Loving v. Virginia as an 
applicable federalism-limiting precedent. Whether the state powers 
discussion in Windsor is read cynically as strategic rhetorical 
maneuvering or more generously, the decision does not in any sense  
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Indiana Tech Law School. Much appreciation to Case Western Reserve 
University Law Review for hosting this symposium; to CWRU Law 
Professor and Academic Dean Jonathan Entin for his mentorship and 
friendship over the years; to Rachel Guin and Lydia LaMont for their 
research and editorial assistance; and to my fellow founding faculty 
members at Indiana Tech Law School for their input and support—and 
for being an outstanding group of colleagues I am honored to work with 
in our collaborative and creative development of an exciting and 
innovative new law school. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise 
1074 
leave marriage equality up to the states to decide but rather builds 
the latest layer of a growing foundation for the ultimate affirmation of 
same-sex marriage rights by the Supreme Court. 
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Introduction 
The adage, “if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck” is a 
familiar one with various formulations and contested origins. Some 
attribute “the duck test” to “celebrated ‘Hoosier Poet’” James 
Whitcomb Riley, who purportedly wrote over a century ago, “[w]hen I 
see a bird that walks like a duck and swims like a duck and quacks 
like a duck, I call that bird a duck.”1 And yet, some attribute a less 
benign history to the duck test, tracing its roots to a McCarthy era 
anti-Communist labor union activist, quoted as saying in the height of 
the “Red Scare” targeting perceived Communists in the United 
States, “A door-opener for the Communist party is worse than a 
 
1. See Walczak v. Labor Works-Fort Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 
n.1 (Ind. 2013) (citing MICHAEL HEIM, EXPLORING INDIANA 
HIGHWAYS: TRIP TRIVIA 68 (2007)). 
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member of the Communist party. When someone walks like a duck, 
swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, he’s a duck.”2 
In retrospect, it is now well known that not everyone who was 
charged with quacking like a Communist during the McCarthy Era 
was in fact a Communist—far from it.3 The Red Scare highlighted the 
reality that things are often not what they seem. Indeed, as history 
has revealed after the fact, even those who persecuted perceived 
Communists in the McCarthy Era were, themselves, not what they 
seemed—patriotic Americans protecting liberty. Rather, they were 
misguided (to put it kindly) politicians who violated the 
constitutional rights and liberties of those they charged as anti-
American Communists.4 
Which is to say, not to ruffle the feathers of any patriotic 
Communist-hating duck hunters, but the “walks like a duck, quacks 
like a duck” adage is one that should not be used liberally but should 
be taken with a grain of context and awareness of its malleability.  
This Article explores a different context for the application of the 
duck test: United States v. Windsor,5 the Supreme Court’s historic 
marriage equality decision striking down Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), which codified a federal definition of marriage 
that excluded same-sex couples, even if their marriages were 
 
2. See, e.g., id. (citing THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 131 (Fred R. 
Shapiro ed., 2006) (attributing quote to labor union activist James B. 
Carey)). But c.f. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pac. Bell, No. 96-02-014, 
1997 WL 868363 at *5 (Cal. Pub. Cont. Oct. 9, 1997) (“It might be 
thought that this case presents the perfect application for the well-
known ‘duck test’ originally proposed by the labor leader Walter 
Reuther.”); Appellate Petition for Review at *5 n.10, Denny’s Inc. v. 
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd., 2003 WL 23017886 (Cal. 2003) 
(No. S113539) (“The quote is sometimes attributed to Walter Reuther 
(1907-1970), American labor leader in the ’30s who is said to have made 
the remark in response to a journalist’s question of how to spot a 
communist.”). 
3. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Victims of the McCarthy Era, In 
Support of Humanitarian Law Project et al. at 7, Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (Nos. 08–1498, 09–89) 
(“In their investigations of more than four million federal civilian 
employees, the government’s two hundred loyalty boards did not 
uncover a single instance of actual espionage or subversive malfeasance” 
(citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in 
Wartime: From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on 
Terrorism 351 (2004))).  
4. See generally Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (holding 
unconstitutional an Arizona statute that effectively criminalized 
membership in subversive organizations by public employees). 
5. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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recognized in their states of domicile.6 In Windsor, Edie Windsor, the 
surviving widow in a same-sex marriage that was recognized in the 
couple’s home state, was slapped with a $363,053 estate tax bill after 
her partner died, pursuant to DOMA’s requirement that only 
opposite-sex marriages be recognized as valid under federal law.7 Had 
Edie’s spouse been a man and their marriage recognized as valid 
under federal law, Edie would not have been taxed for the marital 
estate. After she unsuccessfully sought relief from the IRS, Edie 
brought a federal lawsuit seeking a refund and challenging the 
constitutionality of DOMA on equal protection grounds under the 
Fifth Amendment.8  
In contrast with the Windsor action, another lawsuit challenging 
Section 3 of DOMA had also raised Tenth Amendment and Spending 
Clause claims.9 As described in this Article, asserting Tenth 
Amendment challenges to DOMA was an approach that appealed to 
some who viewed federalism challenges to the Act as strategically 
savvy in a minimalist appealing-to-conservatives way. Although Edie 
Windsor did not similarly assert a Tenth Amendment challenge to 
DOMA on federalism grounds, the Supreme Court’s final decision in 
her favor did contain a passage addressing the general legislative 
authority of states to set marriage laws.10 This inclusion of a state 
powers passage in the majority opinion led some to view the decision 
as a federalist decision that renders the authority to define and 
regulate marriage exclusively a matter of state prerogative.11  
 
6. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”), invalidated by Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675. 
7. 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
8. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 82–85, at 21–22, United States v. Windsor, 833 
F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10 Civ. 8435 (BSJ) (JCF). 
9. Complaint ¶¶ 80–98, at 22–24, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-11156-
JLT). 
10. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2691–93.  
11. Except as otherwise noted (for example, in section I.B., supra, 
addressing the various meanings of “federalism” in more detail), I use 
the terms “federalist” and “federalism” throughout this article neither in 
their neutral sense, i.e., as a general reference to the tensions between 
federal and state power, nor as referencing the original approach to 
federalism as endorsed by the Federalist Party—with which the 
Supreme Court’s early Chief Justice Marshall was aligned—that favored 
strong, centralized federal power and emphasized the supremacy of 
federal law in vertical conflicts of power. See, e.g., McCulloch v. 
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This Article reveals the flaws of such readings of Windsor that 
erroneously conflate Windsor’s discussion of state legislative authority 
with the endorsement of a broader federalism doctrine that would 
allow states to deny marriage rights to entire classifications of people, 
unchecked by even federal judicial review. Such broad, unchecked 
federalism is anathema to the protection of constitutional rights, as it 
would leave some fundamental individual rights up to majority will. 
Moreover, such broad, unchecked federalism is not actually endorsed 
by the majority opinion in Windsor, its state powers passage 
notwithstanding, as revealed by a careful reading of the opinion.  
Metaphorically, this Article explains how the duck test, if applied 
to Windsor, would not render it a federalist decision, despite being so 
labeled by dissenters in that case and by others. Rather, despite 
appearing to quack like a federalist duck, ultimately, Windsor is, in 
effect, something else entirely: a swan song setting the stage for the 
eventual demise of federalist-based marriage discrimination.  
In support of this thesis, Part I of this Article describes the 
history of same-sex marriage litigation, with a particular focus on the 
influence of last century’s “minimalist” movement in steering LGBT 
litigants away from asserting broad constitutional claims in court for 
a number of years.12 The Article details how the minimalist movement 
alternatively advocated a federalism-focused approach toward 
attacking DOMA, as a means of narrowly garnering the five Supreme 
Court votes needed to win the case. Part II describes how some 
Court-watchers consequently viewed Windsor as a “federalist” 
decision when it was released. However, this section further explains 
why Windsor is not, in fact, a federalist decision but is, rather, an 
individual rights decision. Part III offers a somewhat cynical 
 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Under that view, the Tenth 
Amendment, while recognizing unenumerated powers of individuals and 
states, does not create exclusive provinces of state legislation with which 
the federal government may not intervene. See United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 645–52 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Hodel v. 
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 286–88 
(1981). Rather, “federalist” and “federalism” in this article are used to 
reflect the opposite usage of the terms in more recent years, referring to 
the modern conservative reference to “federalism” as incorporating 
preference of strong sovereign state powers, including the view that 
there are zones of exclusively state legislative control under the Tenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
12. Professor Cass R. Sunstein, the most visible proponent of modern 
minimalism, has not offered a clear or consistent definition of the term 
but generally identifies it as relating to the narrowness and shallowness 
of a judicial approach. Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, 
and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1951, 1961–62 (2005).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise 
1078 
explanation of the state powers passage of the Windsor opinion, 
suggesting that Justice Anthony Kennedy’s inclusion of federalism 
overtones in the majority opinion is strategic artifice that deliberately 
masks the decision’s broader purpose of using federalism against 
itself—i.e., engaging federalism-sounding principles only to ultimately 
dismantle federalism-based marriage discrimination. Windsor is 
compared to other instances in history in which powerful rhetoric has 
been used to mask the fact that the speaker’s end goal is the opposite 
of what a surface reading of the speaker’s words might indicate. 
However, Parts IV and V then counteroffer a less cynical reading of 
Windsor, concluding that rather than indicating some type of artifice 
or intentional misdirection, Windsor’s analysis, even with its 
tangential state powers discussion and narrowing language, is 
doctrinally solid and in line with the Court’s past individual  
rights decisions.  
Windsor is but the latest layer of a growing foundation of equal 
liberty jurisprudence, established with deliberate doctrinal integrity to 
ensure greater protections for individual rights over time as both 
society and the courts become more enlightened.13 To some extent, 
foundation-building jurisprudence may reflect a type of minimalism 
urged by some Court-watchers over the years in its paced and 
deliberate tone. However, to a greater extent, Windsor, like its 
predecessors, is a broad affirmation of evolving constitutional 
principles that serves as a doctrinally powerful precedent for future, 
potentially more sweeping, affirmations of equal LGBT rights and 
liberty interests under the Constitution. 
 
13. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, and as inscribed on the ceiling of the 
Jefferson Memorial Rotunda,  
[L]aws and institutions must go hand and hand with the 
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, 
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths 
disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of 
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace 
with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the 
coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain 
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.  
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 
15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 32, 41 (Albert Ellery 
Bergh ed., 1905); see also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 
137 n.15 (1943); Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The 
Right to Privacy Comes Out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
355, 364 & n.46 (2006). 
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I. The Minimalist Movement’s Influence on 
Federalism-Focused Strategy in DOMA Challenges  
The arguments made in DOMA litigation and other LGBT rights 
cases should be understood in context of the caution LGBT rights 
advocates felt leading up to the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage 
cases. The sting of past political backlash kindled a fear not just of 
losing, but also of winning, into the hearts of those convinced that, for 
example, George W. Bush won re-election due to political backlash in 
response to judicial decisions favoring marriage equality.14 As a result, 
LGBT rights advocates largely stayed out of federal court in the years 
following the 2004 election. 
As litigants finally began mounting federal challenges to DOMA, 
some advocates remained cautious, favoring arguments they thought 
to be the safest politically, over more doctrinally ambitious 
arguments. This Part describes how that caution was expressed 
through the flirtation with federalism in some advocates’ and scholars’ 
proposed approaches to overturning DOMA. Perhaps because of such 
expectations that DOMA would be decided on federalist grounds, 
even after Windsor was issued on individual rights grounds, it was 
nonetheless interpreted as a federalist decision by some Court-
watchers and even some members of the Court itself who fell on the 
dissenting side of Windsor. 
A. Backlash Fears and Hollow Hopes:  
The Movement Toward Minimalism 
Prior to the Proposition 815 and DOMA16 decisions by the 
Supreme Court, there was widespread reluctance to bring a same-sex 
marriage case to federal court for fear of losing and setting bad 
precedent.17 The devastating negative impact of the anti-LGBT  
14. See, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Gay Marriage: Did Issue Help Re-elect 
Bush?, S.F. Chronicle, Nov. 4, 2004, at A1, A16.  
15. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (striking down on 
standing grounds, California’s Proposition 8, which banned same-sex 
marriages in California in response to a court decision that allowed 
thousands of same-sex couples in California to wed). 
16. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
17. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Making Sense of the Marriage Debate, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (2013) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013)) (describing “the express 
design of LGBT-rights litigators, who elected to stay out of federal court 
for nearly twenty years”); Maura Dolan, Battles Brew as Gay Marriage 
Ban Is Upheld, L.A. Times, May 27, 2009, at A1, A12 (“Gay rights 
lawyers have urged supporters to stay out of federal court, fearful of a 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling that could set the same-sex marriage 
movement back decades.”). 
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Bowers v. Hardwick18 decision was, after all, still fresh in the minds of 
many, even after it was overturned by Lawrence v. Texas.19  
Among some LGBT-rights advocates, there was also a fear of 
winning, because of the negative repercussions that might ensue. The 
risk of harmful political backlash seemed most evident in the years 
when anti-LGBT constitutional amendments were succeeding at the 
ballot following two state supreme court decisions affirming marriage 
rights of LGBT individuals and same-sex couples, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court case Baehr v. Lewin20 and, a decade later, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court case Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health,21 which was decided the same year as the Supreme 
Court’s Lawrence decision. In addition to Congress enacting DOMA, 
between 1996 and 2005, the majority of states either enacted mini-
DOMA statutes or amended their state constitutions to prohibit 
same-sex marriage.22  
Despite this temporary legislative backlash, in the span of the 
twenty years between 1993 and 2013, opinion polls reflected an overall 
increasing trajectory of support for same-sex marriage rights and 
LGBT equality. Nationwide support of same-sex marriage rose from 
around 20% in support of marriage in 199323 to 54–57% in support in 
the second half of 2013.24 Comparative studies of polls over the years 
have conclusively demonstrated “that the public is growing  
18. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
19. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
20. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
21. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
22. Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54 
DRAKE L. REV. 861, 879 (2006). Twenty-three states passed laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage and recognizing same-sex marriages 
performed elsewhere while eighteen states added similar constitutional 
amendments. Id. at 869. 
23. Patrick J. Egan & Nathaniel Persily, Court Decisions and Trends in 
Support for Same-Sex Marriage, POLLING REPORT fig.1 (Aug. 17, 
2009), http://www.pollingreport.com/penp0908.htm.  
24. Susan Page, Same-Sex Marriage at Record Approval, USA Today, July 
2, 2013, at 1A (showing that 55% of Americans approve of same-sex 
marriage); Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Polling Instit., U.S. 
Catholics Back Pope On Changing Church Focus, Quinnipiac University 
National Poll Finds; Catholics Support Gay Marriage, Women Priests 
2–1, 3 (Oct. 4, 2013) http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us/ 
us10042013_er9hjp.pdf/ (56% of all adults, 60% of Catholics, and 57% 
of registered voters); Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize 
Gay Marriage in 50 States, GALLUP, (July 29, 2013), http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx 
(“54% think gay marriages should be recognized as valid, with the same 
rights as marriages between men and women.”). 
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increasingly more amenable to same-sex marriage and that judicial 
decisions are unlikely to reverse that trend.”25  
By 2011, even the head of Focus on the Family had conceded that 
the organization, arguably the largest group of organized same-sex 
marriage opponents in the country, had lost the battle to keep 
marriage defined as solely between a man and a woman, stating the 
following in an interview: 
We’re losing on that one, especially among the 20- and 30-
somethings: 65 to 70 percent of them favor same-sex marriage. I 
don’t know if that’s going to change with a little more age—
demographers would say probably not. We’ve probably lost 
that. I don’t want to be extremist here, but I think we need to 
start calculating where we are in the culture.26  
 As more court-watchers and political analysts began to conclude, 
the early marriage opinions, if anything, should actually be credited 
with “start[ing] a process that culminated in same-sex couples 
securing widespread relationship protections.”27 Professor Tom 
Goldstein describes the recent Supreme Court LGBT rights cases as 
having sent the “moral message . . . that these unions are entitled to 
equal respect. . . . [T]hat is probably the lasting legacy of the 
decisions and is probably going to play a significant role in public 
opinion.”28  
Not only has the acceptance of same-sex marriage risen 
substantially in public polling, but the number of states recognizing 
same-sex unions rose dramatically as well in the decade between the 
2003 Goodridge decision and the 2013 Windsor decision. In that time, 
a dozen states and the District of Columbia legalized same-sex 
marriage.29 By the end of 2013, only six months after Windsor, 
eighteen jurisdictions in the United States granted recognition to 
same-sex unions or had voted to do so.30 This tally does not even 
 
25. Egan & Persily, supra note 23; see also Patrick J. Egan, Nathaniel 
Persily & Kevin Wallsten, Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234–66 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 
2008). 
26. See Marvin Olasky, Q&A, Refocused, WORLD, June 4, 2011, at 28, 28 
(interviewing Jim Daly, CEO & President, Focus on the Family). 
27. E.g., Schacter, supra note 22, at 871. 
28. Page, supra note 24, at 1A. 
29. United States v. Windsor,  2675, 2689 (2013). 
30. Those states, in addition to the District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 46-
401 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)), included California (In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, Cal. 
Const. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013)); Connecticut (Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 
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include the numerous other localities and several states that 
additionally provided same-sex partnership recognition through civil 
unions or domestic partnerships by then.  
In contrast, two decades before, when DOMA was enacted in the 
aftermath of Baehr and Goodridge, no state had yet granted same-sex 
marriage rights.31 
Regardless, at least before the Court had issued four pro-LGBT 
rights opinions—Romer v. Evans,32 Lawrence v. Texas, Hollingsworth 
v. Perry33 and United States v. Windsor—some LGBT-rights activists 
blamed their movement’s judicial victories for its legislative defeats 
and perceived public backlash. They lamented that the public had not 
been ready for judicial affirmations of constitutional rights for LGBT 
citizens, and that the backlash resulting from such victories was not 
worth the victories themselves. Their warnings urging LGBT litigants 
away from pursuing their day in court to protect their constitutional 
rights were fueled by an academic call for minimalism spearheaded by 
Gerald Rosenberg’s influential book, The Hollow Hope,34 and 
 
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit.13, § 129 
(Supp. 2013)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (2012)); Illinois 
(Religious Freedom and Fairness Act, ch. 20, para. 201, 209, 212, 220, 
2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. 4128–30 (West), (to be codified at ILL. COMP. 
STAT. §§ 750-5/201, /209, /212, /220 (Supp. 2014))); Iowa (Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. Ann. 
tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2013)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 
§ 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013)); Massachusetts 
(Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) and 
In re Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004)); 
Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.03 (Supp. 2014)); Nevada (NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010–122A.510 (LexisNexis 2010), amended by Nev. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 122A.100, .500 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)); New 
Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2013); New Jersey 
(Garden State Equal. v. Dow, L-1729-11, 2013 WL 6153269 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. Sept. 27), stay denied, 79 A.3d 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div.), cert. granted, 75 A.3d 1157 (N.J.), and stay denied, 79 A.3d 1036 
(N.J. 2013)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. Ann. § 40-1-4 (LexisNexis 
2004) (honoring marriages performed out of state)); New York (N.Y. 
DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014); Rhode Island (R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (2013); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 8 
(2010); and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 
(West Supp. 2013)).  
31. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.  
32. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s Amendment 2, which had 
in effect prohibited all civil rights protections for gays and bisexuals). 
33. 133. S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  
34. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) [hereinafter THE HOLLOW HOPE]. 
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echoed by legal scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Michael 
Klarman.35  
The original 1991 version of The Hollow Hope cautions 
against oppressed minorities seeking social reform through litigation, 
contending that the judiciary is, and should be, constrained by 
political considerations.36 During the heyday of The Hollow Hope’s 
popularity among social justice lawyers at the turn of the century, 
Cass Sunstein frequently cited the book to urge a more minimalist 
view of the federal courts’ appropriate role in affecting social change.37  
In the context of LGBT rights specifically, Sunstein cited The 
Hollow Hope to discourage LGBT litigants from bringing equal-
protection claims to court, writing, “even if discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation is often a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, courts should be cautious and selective in vindicating that 
principle.”38 Sunstein warned, for example, that if the Supreme Court 
issued a marriage equality opinion too soon,  
 
35. See infra notes 35, 38, 40, 42, 44, and 46. 
36. See, e.g., THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 34, at 343 (“In assuming that 
courts can overcome political obstacles, and produce change without 
mobilization and participation, reformers both reified and removed 
courts from the political and economic system in which they operate.”). 
37. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal 
Justice, 72 TEX. L. REV. 305, 308–09 (1993) (urging judges to exercise 
more modesty and recognize that due in part to their lack of “a good 
electoral pedigree,” they should not attempt “to bring about significant 
social reform on their own” but instead recognize that “constitutional 
rights are judicially ‘underenforced,’ and properly so, because of the 
courts’ distinctive limitations.”) (emphasis added); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the 
Supreme Court (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1649, 1649 n.3 (2004) (additionally citing to Mark Tushnet, 
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999) and Cass 
R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003)); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 361 & n.2 (1996) (“Supreme Court 
decisions may be counterproductive. If it is understood as a case about 
gender equality, Roe v. Wade is a possible example since the Court’s 
decision may well have damaged the effort to produce gender 
equality.”); Cass R. Sunstein, From Theory to Practice, 29 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 389, 394 (1997) (arguing that in the context of abortion rights, the 
Court failed to be cognizant of its institutional limits and “ought not to 
have invoked ambitious abstractions about privacy or liberty to resolve 
so many issues so quickly”); Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Public 
Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 1179, 1179, 1182 & n.11 (1996) (arguing affirmative action should 
be left to popular vote, not judicial decision, as a matter of pragmatism 
and principle). 
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 
25 (1994). 
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[I]t might cause a constitutional crisis, a weakening of the 
legitimacy of the Court, an intensifying of homophobia, a 
constitutional amendment overturning the Court’s decision, and 
much more. Any Court, even one committed to the basic 
principle [of equal protection], should hesitate in the face of such 
prospects. It would be far better for the Court to start 
cautiously and to proceed incrementally.39 
These minimalist arguments urging civil rights advocates to 
eschew federal courts as agents for social justice, and, alternatively, 
advocating incremental over broad social change, continued generally 
even after the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was 
widely perceived as a minimalist and who seems to have been the 
target of a substantial amount of minimalism scholarship.40  
In the arena of LGBT rights, the push toward minimalism 
continued even after the first two LGBT-rights Supreme Court 
victories, Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans.41 Klarman, for 
example, wrote in 2005 that “[b]y outpacing public opinion on issues 
of social reform,” such rulings mobilize opponents, undercut 
moderates, and retard the cause they purport to advance.”42 That  
39. Id. at 26.  
40. See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1082 (2009) (describing O’Connor as a 
“minimalist by all measures”); Louis D. Bilionis, Grand Centrism and 
the Centrist Judicial Personam, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1353–54 (2005) 
(“Justice O’Connor is the exemplary practitioner of the style of judging 
that likely comes to mind most often when Court watchers and 
constitutional law cognoscenti allude to judicial centrism—what I will 
call here, with no claim to originality and a standing reference to the 
work of Cass Sunstein, ‘minimalist centrism.’”); Steve France, Opinions 
with Style: Scholar Says Court Has Embraced O’Connor’s 
“Minimalism,” A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 38, 38 (describing Cass 
Sunstein and Sandra Day O’Connor as an “odd couple” for their 
minimalist views); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a 
Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 
1177, 1189–90 (2001) (footnotes omitted) (“Justice O’Connor in 
particular, like Justice Ginsburg, seems to embody minimalism’s 
purported virtues. O’Connor never articulates broad rules, opting 
instead for context-based balancing tests. She is particularly deferential 
to precedent. She is, to some commentators, frustrating precisely 
because of her reluctance to endorse deep justifications.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006) (“In 
the nation’s history, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Sandra Day 
O’Connor have been the most prominent practitioners of Burkean 
minimalism, in the sense that they have tended to favor small steps and 
close attention to both experience and tradition.”).  
41. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
42. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 431, 482 (2005). 
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said, by 2013, Klarman had reversed himself and substantially 
softened his opposition to same-sex marriage equality litigation. As 
Professor Schacter’s review of Klarman’s book on the history of same-
sex marriage litigation describes: 
Although Klarman covers much of the same ground in the 
book and alludes to the same factors in explaining the backlash, 
there is a noticeable change of tone and conclusion from the 
earlier article. In the book, Klarman is much less committed to 
a negative assessment of litigating for same-sex marriage at a 
time when public opinion was not supportive. Indeed, having 
explored both the costs and benefits of litigation, he concludes 
in the book that, “[o]n balance, litigation has probably advanced 
the cause of gay marriage more than it has retarded it.” And, to 
a much greater degree than he did in his earlier work, Klarman 
recognizes that “[l]itigation put gay marriage on the table,” and 
that, had early litigation not made marriage salient, it is 
“unlikely that more than 50 percent of Americans would 
support gay marriage in 2012.” To his credit, Klarman notes 
expressly in the book that some of his views have changed. 
Klarman is not alone in having perspectives on the marriage 
controversy that have “evolved,” and I think his candor about it 
is admirable. Indeed, the fact that the marriage debate has 
moved so quickly, and public support for marriage equality risen 
so rapidly, has created a challenge for scholars analyzing the 
debate in real time. At a minimum, the fast pace of change 
means that it is wise for anyone studying the issues to revisit 
and reassess, rather than clinging to earlier expressed opinions.43 
Cass Sunstein also backtracked somewhat from his original 
minimalism, ironically distancing himself from the minimalist 
movement he helped to create. In 2008, for example, he wrote that 
that minimalism is often “a terrible blunder,”44 and he 
condescendingly mocked minimalists for possessing “characteristic 
timidity” or even “cowardice.”45 Instead of criticizing broad decisions, 
he offered praise for broad, sweeping adjudication of social justice 
issues, concluding that cases such as “Brown v. Board of Education, 
New York Times Company v. Sullivan[, and] Brandenburg v. 
Ohio . . . deserve celebration, not lament.”46  
 
43. Schacter, supra note 17, at 1193–94 (quoting Klarman, supra note 17, 
at 208, 218). 
44. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825, 
825 (2008). 
45. Id. at 827. 
46. Id. at 841 (footnotes omitted). 
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However, Sunstein’s newfound respect for broad judicial civil 
rights decisions was not absolute, as evidenced in that very same 
article. Even after Romer and Lawrence, he continued to advocate 
minimalism as the preferred approach in some contexts, including 
same-sex marriage. Specifically, he wrote: 
Frequently ordinary people disagree in some deep way on an 
issue—what to do in the Middle East, pornography, same-sex 
marriages, the war on terror—and sometimes they agree not to 
discuss that issue much, as a way of deferring to each other’s 
strong convictions and showing a measure of reciprocity and 
respect (even if they do not at all respect the particular 
conviction that is at stake). If reciprocity and mutual respect 
are desirable, it follows that public officials or judges, perhaps 
even more than ordinary people, should not challenge their 
fellow citizens’ deepest and most defining commitments, at least 
if those commitments are reasonable and if there is no need for 
them to do so. Indeed, we can see a kind of political charity in 
the refusal to contest those commitments when life can proceed 
without any such contest.47 
Such a dismissive statement that life goes on (“life can proceed”) even 
if same-sex couples are denied judicial protections against marriage 
discrimination, and that it might actually be charitable to deny them 
their day in court, might give same-sex marriage proponents pause in 
following Sunstein’s litigation strategy advice. At the very least, it 
reflects that he is less receptive toward LGBT claims than to other 
civil rights claims as appropriate subjects of constitutional litigation.  
Staying even more doggedly true to his original position is The 
Hollow Hope’s author, Rosenberg, who in a 2006 article wrote, 
“[t]he battle for same-sex marriage would have been better served if 
they had never brought litigation, or had lost their cases.”48 Then, in 
2008, Rosenberg added a supplement to The Hollow Hope 
devoted solely to extending his pessimistic attitude toward judicial 
review to the context of same-sex marriage, with one chapter titled 
“Confusing Rights with Reality.”49 In the final section of the 2008 
supplement, even more contemptuously titled, “When Will They Ever 
Learn?,” Rosenberg insisted that same-sex marriage advocates had 
“clearly” not succeeded but had gone to court too soon and had 
“confused the rhetoric of rights with the reality of reaction.”50 He  
47. Id. at 832–33. 
48.  Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the 
Wrong Places, 54 Drake L. Rev. 795, 813 (2006). 
49. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 355–429 (2d. ed. 2008).  
50. Id. at 415–19.  
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lambasted same-sex marriage litigants and attorneys, accusing them 
of “leaping beyond what the American public could bear,” thereby 
setting back their own cause.51 Rosenberg continued these attacks on 
marriage equality litigation in a 2009 later article as well,52 despite the 
increasing support for marriage equality strongly evident in polls by 
then,53 writing that same-sex marriage litigation “set back [the] goal of 
marriage equality for at least a generation.”54  
In recent years, Sunstein’s comparatively restrained but persistent 
defense of minimalism in the context of same-sex marriage, 
Rosenberg’s pessimistic and stridently hollow same-sex marriage 
predictions, and other minimalist “Backlash Theorists” are being 
drowned out by the more optimistic and forward-thinking “Backlash 
Skeptics,” as dubbed by Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. 
Law.55 In contrast with the “Backlash Theorists” such as Sunstein, 
Rosenberg, and the older incarnation of Klarman, the “Backlash 
Skeptics” (including the now-LGBT-litigation-friendly Klarman) 
argue that litigation remains an effective and important tool for social 
change, including in the context of same-sex marriage.56 The same 
cases Backlash Theorists charge with causing backlash are, it is 
increasingly recognized, actually responsible in part for the growing 
popular acceptance of same-sex marriage, increased legislative 
protections for LGBT individuals and same-sex couples in other 
contexts, and a dramatic rise in the number of states with 
relationship protections for same-sex couples.57 
Since the Backlash Theorists’ pessimistic predictions of continued 
backlash and defeat for same-sex marriage advocates failed to come to 
fruition in, or after, Windsor, Sunstein has described Windsor in 
mixed terms. On the one hand, while conceding in a 2013 Internet 
post that “Windsor isn’t exactly a minimalist decision,” he critically 
describes Windsor as emphasizing “an unruly mixture of 
 
51. See id. (criticizing same-sex marriage proponents for not employing an 
incremental strategy).  
52.  Gerald N. Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky and the Litigation Campaign to Win 
the Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 643 (2009). 
53. See Egan & Persily, supra note 23.  
54. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 656.  
55. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and 
the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 33 U. Haw. L. Rev. 705, 744–48 
(2011).  
56. See id. at 746 (“Change will come in most of these places only, if at all, 
through federal court intervention.”). 
57. Id. at 747–48. 
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constitutional concerns,” which “leave[s] a great deal undecided.”58 On 
the other hand, he then softens his tone toward Windsor, ultimately 
describing it as a decision reflecting appropriate judicial restraint in 
“resting its ruling on the foundation of human dignity.”59  
As for Rosenberg, he fell silent in the aftermath of Windsor. It 
remains to be seen whether in his future writings he will continue to 
try to dismiss the issue of same-sex marriage inequality as one that 
civil rights advocates should not have turned to the courts to resolve. 
If, even after Windsor, he continues to wish failure upon marriage 
equality litigators60 and to charge same-sex marriage litigants with 
“set[ting] back [the] goal of marriage equality for at least a 
generation,”61 he is not likely to have much of a chorus of supporting 
followers any longer, at least among LGBT rights advocates. 
As of this Article’s writing, there have been no law journal 
articles from LGBT rights/marriage equality advocates citing 
Rosenberg or Sunstein, or Klarman’s older writings, to argue, for 
example, that LGBT rights litigators should continue taking a more 
minimalist approach and refrain from turning to the courts to secure 
equal rights, or warning of post-Windsor backlash.  
In place of the Backlash Theorists, the Backlash Skeptics are now 
becoming more prominent in the same-sex marriage litigation strategy 
dialogue, rising above the hollowness of The Hollow Hope and 
urging a new, more optimistic, look at the appropriate role of the 
Courts in protecting civil rights through judicial review. However, 
leading up to the Windsor litigation, some still clung to the 
cautionary words of The Hollow Hope and the corresponding 
minimalist backlash theory movement, as described in the following 
section. 
B. How the Minimalist Movement Led to a Push for  
Federalist Anti-DOMA Arguments 
As marriage equality challenges approached the Supreme Court, 
the minimalist movement continued its chorus of what Professors 
Lawrence Tribe and Joshua Matz have described as a “comparative 
harmony of gradualism [that] holds sway, a tense balance between the 
undoubted benefits of marriage equality litigation and the real danger 
that a boldly liberal ruling could set our country ablaze at just the 
 
58. Cass R. Sunstein, Gay-Marriage Ruling Safeguards Human Dignity, 
BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2013, 4:15 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2013-06-26/gay-marriage-ruling-safeguards-human-dignity.html. 
59. Id. 
60. Rosenberg, supra note 48, at 813 (“The battle for same sex-marriage 
would have been better served if [same-sex marriage advocates] had 
never brought litigation, or had lost their cases.”).  
61. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 656.  
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wrong moment.”62 Minimalists warned that a marriage inequality 
ruling could result in the type of backlash that was “unleashed with 
terrible force after Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.”63 
To avoid either losing completely or winning too big and sparking 
such a backlash, some LGBT rights advocates favored a careful 
minimalist strategy in attacking DOMA. They envisioned reaching 
the goal of securing at least five votes from the Supreme Court 
justices through a restrained decision on narrow federalism grounds 
that might appeal to a majority of the justices.64  
Minimalism advocates who embraced federalist arguments as a 
strategically savvy, narrow means of overturning DOMA had their 
support in a number of scholars who did not themselves identify as 
“minimalist,” but who nonetheless saw the potential for a successful 
federalist challenge to DOMA.65 Federalism, after all, offered a 
tempting avenue of argument that might appeal to a majority of 
Justices, while allowing the Court the “out” of issuing a ruling more 
 
62. See Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, An Ephemeral Moment: 
Minimalism, Equality, and Federalism in the Struggle for Same-Sex 
Marriage Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 199, 202 (2013) 
(comparing today’s reaction with the backlash after Goodrich v. 
Department of Public Health). 
63. Id. 
64. See Adam E. Brauner & Andreas J. Meyer, A Closer Look at the 
Marriage Equality Cases Before the United States Supreme Court, 
Orange County Law, May 2013, at 18 (“In the case of Windsor, 
LGBT activists across the country are optimistic, perhaps because 
multiple avenues to a positive outcome seem to exist, including ones 
that are consistent with conservative legal ideologies. For example, it 
has been suggested that certain members of the Court’s conservative 
wing, such as Chief Justice John Roberts or Justice Clarence Thomas, 
may vote to overturn the law on federalism grounds, like some 
conservative judges in lower courts have done in other cases.”). 
65. See, e.g., William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in 
Federal Statutes, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1379 (2012) (“Indeed, many of 
DOMA’s critics have articulated the attack in federalist terms.”) (citing, 
in part, David B. Cruz, Essay, The Defense of Marriage Act and 
Uncategorical Federalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 805, 815–23 
(2011), and Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and 
Legal Defects in the “Defense of Marriage” Act, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 
221, 231–39 (1996)). See also Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces 
of Federalism, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 457 (1998) (“In its haste to pass 
DOMA and to put the President in a politically unpalatable position, 
Congress did not adequately take into account the potential 
constitutional ramifications of DOMA and its threat to our federalist 
system.”). 
.  
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moderate and narrow in tone than a decision based, for example, on 
substantive due process.66  
Some litigants consequently chose to base their DOMA challenge 
on federalist grounds, with some success in Massachusetts v. United 
States Department of Health & Human Services.67 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held that although DOMA did not 
violate the Tenth Amendment, it nonetheless implicated federalist 
“concerns,” which warranted a closer look at the governmental68 
justifications for the statute:  
[The consequences upon states of the] denial of federal benefits 
to same-sex couples lawfully married . . . do not violate the 
Tenth Amendment . . . but Congress’ effort to put a thumb on 
the scales and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its 
own marriage laws does bear on how the justifications are 
assessed.  
. . . . 
Given that DOMA intrudes broadly into an area of traditional 
state regulation, a closer examination of the justifications that 
would prevent DOMA from violating equal protection (and thus 
from exceeding federal authority) is uniquely reinforced by 
federalism concerns.69 
The First Circuit’s treatment of DOMA’s unusual deviation from 
federalist principles not as providing the basis of an 
 
66. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[T]he 
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive 
due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this 
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” (citing Regents of Univ. of 
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1985))); see also CHARLES L. 
BLACK JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND 
UNNAMED 3, 100–01 (1997) (“This paradoxical, even oxymoronic 
phrase—‘substantive due process’—has been inflated into a patched and 
leaky tire on which precariously rides the load of some substantive 
human rights not named in the Constitution[] . . . .[T]his non-concept 
rests on insufficient commitment, and has too little firm meaning (if it 
has any at all) to beget the kind of confidence, in judges or in others, 
that ought to underlie the regime of human rights.”). 
67. 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2884, 2887 (2013). 
68. By “governmental” justifications, I mean those set forth by “BLAG,” 
the “Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group” that took over the defense of 
DOMA after the Department of Justice declined to defend it. See 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013); H.R. Res. 5, 
113th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(1)(B) (2013) (“[BLAG] continues to speak 
for, and articulates the institutional position of, the House in all 
litigation matters in which it appears, including in Windsor v. United 
States.”). 
69. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12–13. 
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unconstitutionality holding, but, rather, as triggering more careful 
scrutiny of government justifications was what one scholar, Professor 
Courtney Joslin, dubbed “the unusualness trigger theory,”70 one of 
many possible approaches to federalism.  
The First Circuit’s approach to federalism in Massachusetts was, 
critically, quite different from that taken by the lower court in that 
case. The lower court had deemed DOMA to be a categorical 
violation of the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty because “the 
authority to regulate marital status is a sovereign attribute of 
statehood.”71 As Professor David Cruz argued in an article published 
after the district court’s decision but prior to the subsequent First 
Circuit decision, the “categorical federalism approach” reflected by 
the district court’s opinion is problematic, because “[c]urrent 
doctrine . . . does not recognize the Tenth Amendment as a font of 
categorical free-floating subject matter limitations on federal power.”72 
However, Cruz offered that uncategorical arguments should still be 
made for DOMA’s unconstitutionality on federalist grounds, 
highlighting, for example, how DOMA uniquely operates “in the core” 
of domestic relations by redefining marriage “across the board in 
virtually any area in which the federal government acts,” and in the 
process singling out same-sex married couples for de-classification as 
married, despite their state’s laws respecting their marriages, thereby 
“violat[ing] constitutional federalism principles, even if not for the 
categorical reason seemingly relied on by the District Court in 
Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and Human 
Services.”73  
In yet another approach to using federalism to pursue marriage 
equality, Tribe and Matz explain that a properly argued federalism-
based challenge could be made to DOMA without undermining a 
future federal challenge to a state marriage ban because “[t]he Court’s 
doctrinal expression of federalism favors freedom from federal 
government intrusion rather than a right to federal government 
protection.”74 In other words, federalism is a sword against the federal 
legislative branch exceeding its authority but is not a shield states 
may use to ward off federal judicial review. As Tribe and Matz 
explain:  
70. Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 163 (2013). http://www.columbialawrev
iew.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Joslin-113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-
Sidebar-156.pdf.  
71. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 
F. Supp. 2d 234, 251 (D. Mass. 2010). 
72. Cruz, supra note 65, at 819.  
73. Id. at 827. 
74. Tribe & Matz, supra note 62, at 209–10.  
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For marriage equality, federalism-based principles of respect for 
traditional state autonomy and sub-national political process 
provide a sword against regressive federal laws (such as DOMA) 
without affording a shield to regressive state laws (such as 
same-sex marriage bans). 
We are thus dealing with a rather particular federalism: one 
that does not respect states’ choices about whether to expand 
liberty, but only state choices that actually do so; that limits 
federal legislative power when it intrudes upon comparatively 
liberty-enhancing state policy, but does not limit federal judicial 
power that intrudes upon comparatively regressive state policy. 
At least in this context, federalism is a one-way ratchet toward 
liberty (or at least a certain kind of liberty). A civil rights 
advocate is tempted to think, Vive la Fédéralisme!75 
With these various views on federalism’s meaning and appropriate 
role in judicial challenges to DOMA percolating across the country in 
the years leading up to Windsor, the sword-shield approach is 
consistent with the Massachusetts court’s explanation of the limited 
role of federalism as applied to DOMA. In that case, the First Circuit 
explained:  
Supreme Court interpretations of the Tenth Amendment have 
varied over the years but those in force today have struck down 
statutes only where Congress sought to commandeer state 
governments or otherwise directly dictate the internal 
operations of state government. Whatever its spin-off effects, 
section 3 governs only federal programs and funding, and does 
not share these two vices of commandeering or direct 
command.76 
While there were competing views by same-sex marriage 
advocates and scholars on precisely what a federalist argument in a 
DOMA challenge should look like, federalism remained a pervasive 
theme in dialogues on the constitutionality of DOMA in the years 
leading up to Windsor. When DOMA finally arrived at the Supreme 
Court through the Windsor case, two sets of amici, unsurprisingly, 
presented federalist arguments to the Court in favor of striking down 
DOMA, although the two amici briefs took different approaches to 
arguing federalism. As Professor Joslin describes, the amici 
 
75. Id. at 210. 
76. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12 
(1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 2884, 2887 
(2013). 
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“Federalism Scholars” made a categorical argument that the power to 
define marital status lies solely with the states.77 
In contrast, “[a] qualitatively different federalism-based argument 
was pressed by other parties and amici,”78 namely that Section 3 of 
DOMA should be subject to careful scrutiny under equal protection 
review because, in addition to other things, it “‘intrudes on the 
States’ traditional authority to regulate marriage and family 
relations.’”79  
In Perry, the companion case to Windsor, a separate amicus brief 
urged the Court more generally toward incremental judicial 
restraint.80 Tribe and Matz describe that brief, which warned against 
granting certiorari in the Proposition 8 case, as an “amicus brief 
buil[t] on a wave of scholarship that blends history and political 
science into grand narratives that preach the comparative merits of 
legal gradualism, especially when pegged to shifting public opinion 
and a Court keen to conserve its nebulous institutional capital.”81 
Tribe and Matz grant that there is “much to commend” about the 
type of minimalism advocated by the amicus brief, once one considers 
 
77. Joslin, supra note 70, at 161 (citing Brief of Federalism Scholars as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor at 3–4, United States 
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)). 
78. Id. at 162. 
79. Id. (quoting Brief on the Merits for the States of New York et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 3, 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307)). 
80. See Brief of Amici Curiae William N. Eskridge Jr., Bruce A. Ackerman, 
Daniel A. Farber & Andrew Koppelman in Support of Respondents at 
15–20, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144); 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307). One of the brief’s authors, 
Andrew Koppelman, was a member of Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law’s same-sex marriage symposium for which this Article is 
submitted; I was honored to share a panel with him on the doctrinal 
meaning of Windsor. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels 
of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 Case. W. Res. L. 
Rev. 1045 (2014). 
81. Tribe & Matz, supra note 62, at 202–03. The article by Tribe and Matz, 
presenting a snapshot of the months following the filing of the amicus 
briefs in Perry and Windsor but prior to Court’s decisions in those 
cases, describes more broadly what they then perceived as “the shifting 
role of minimalism,” and its interplay with gay rights advocates’ “fickle 
romance with federalism” in the pursuit of liberty and equal protections 
in that historic moment in time. Id. at 200. Recounting the 
pervasiveness of the push toward minimalism in LGBT rights litigation 
in these “fragile times [when the Court is] delicately poised on Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s evolving vision of liberty,” id. at 199, Tribe and 
Matz note the frequent tendency of federal courts in same-sex marriage 
cases “moved by a powerful spirit of minimalism to concentrate their 
firepower on smaller targets” and thereby prevent backlash. Id. at 201. 
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the uncertainty of a Supreme Court victory for marriage equality and 
the risk of backlash.82 While agreeing it would not be expedient to 
disregard the tactical considerations represented by minimalism, they 
nonetheless describe minimalism as “a gamble on an uncertain 
future—a bet that the Court will not tilt irretrievably conservative, 
that state-level constitutional bans on same-sex marriage can be 
overcome through political process, and that we are learning (but not 
overlearning) the right lessons from our complicated past.”83 Thus, 
they conclude, “[a] measure of modesty in addressing these 
questions—whether we should be minimalist in litigation and in the 
goals of adjudication and, if so, how—will remain critical as LGBT 
rights advocates move forward.”84 
In the end, it is the cautious approach to federalism that seems 
the sagest, although it is admittedly easy to say that from the relative 
luxury of an after-the-fact retrospective when it is now evident that a 
majority of the Windsor Court would be receptive to individual 
rights-based attacks on DOMA, rather than a Tenth Amendment 
federalist claim.  
Most importantly, some rights are, quite simply, too fundamental 
to be left to majority will. As explained by a federal court in Utah, 
upon applying Windsor to strike down that state’s same-sex 
constitutional marriage ban, “[t]he Constitution guarantees that all 
citizens have certain fundamental rights. These rights vest in every 
person over whom the Constitution has authority and, because they 
are so important, an individual’s fundamental rights ‘may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.’”85 
Thus, especially “[g]iven the importance of marriage as a fundamental 
right and its relation to an individual’s rights to liberty, privacy, and 
association, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to invalidate state 
laws pertaining to marriage whenever such a law intrudes on an 
individual’s protected realm of liberty.”86 Leaving fundamental rights 
to the vote of a simple democratic majority can too easily result in 
the type of majority tyranny our Constitution was written to prevent; 
 
82. Id. at 203.  
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874, at *9 (D. Utah 
Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 638 (1943)). Kitchen v. Herbert is one of two federal decisions, 
along with a similar Oklahoma decision, Bishop v. United States ex rel. 
Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 
14, 2014), which struck down such a state constitutional provision in the 
six months following Windsor.  
86. Kitchen, 2013 WL 6697874, at *11. 
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it is anathema to our constitutional democracy for free-flowing 
prejudices to be left unchecked by federal constitutional safeguards.87  
The vestiges of the same type of prejudice that caused racial 
segregation, prompting federal judicial intervention in Brown v. Board 
of Education,88 were also present in state interracial marriage bans, 
prompting federal judicial intervention in Loving v. Virginia.89 
However, had those issues been left to majority will, state-by-state, 
there would likely remain states that prohibit people from marrying 
the loves of their life if one’s beloved is of a different race, just as, 
today (as of the writing of this Article), many states continue to 
prohibit people from marrying the loves of their life if one’s beloved is 
of the same sex.  
As the federal district court in the Utah case recognized, 
individual and state rights “are both weighty concerns.”90 The Kitchen 
court further explained, however, that where they are in direct 
opposition to each other, Supreme Court cases such as Loving have in 
analogous circumstances resolved that tension by establishing “that 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that individual rights take 
precedence over states’ rights where these two interests are in 
conflict” and “holding that a state’s power to regulate marriage is 
limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.”91 After all, in the end, 
federal constitutional rights are, under the Supremacy Clause of 
Article VI the U.S. Constitution, supreme over state laws that 
threaten to deny those rights.  
C. The Doctrinal Bases for the Plaintiffs’ Argument  
and the Court’s Holding in Windsor 
While federalist arguments remained too tempting for some amici 
in Windsor to resist, the plaintiffs, in contrast, did not ultimately 
base their case on a state powers federalist argument. Rather, their 
 
87. See Barbara J. Cox, “The Tyranny of the Majority Is No Myth”: Its 
Dangers for Same-Sex Couples, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235, 
244–50 (2013) (discussing the threat of majority tyranny generally, and 
to same-sex couples specifically, through an examination of ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835), THE FEDERALIST No. 10 
(James Madison); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 
2012); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 
(1938)). 
88.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
89. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Loving, it is worth emphasizing, was not a federalist 
decision and was also enforced with none of the problems faced by 
schools trying to desegregate after Brown; nor should a parallel decision 
striking down same-sex marriage bans have any more enforcement 
problems than occurred after Loving. 
90. Kitchen, 2013 WL 6697874, at *7.  
91. Id. 
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argument emphasized individual constitutional rights: the denial of 
equal protection of fundamental liberties resulting from DOMA’s 
destructive force on the rights of same-sex married couples.92  
Perhaps this was in part due to the fact that, by then, the civil 
rights litigation movement’s enthusiastic (and misguided) love affair 
with The Hollow Hope and minimalism had died down just 
enough for the plaintiffs in Windsor to rely on strong, impassioned, 
and principled individual rights arguments. Or perhaps the plaintiffs 
were never that tempted to emphasize Tenth Amendment arguments 
in lieu of equal protection and liberty arguments in the first place. 
They may have been sufficiently confident (and rightly so) that the 
rights at issue were the same privacy and liberty rights that were 
recognized in the last two LGBT-rights cases, and in a long line of 
individual autonomy cases before then,93 even though minimalists 
might decry such equal liberty building blocks as too abstract and 
amorphous to form a proper basis for a Supreme Court decision.  
For whichever reason, rather than claim that DOMA violated the 
Tenth Amendment, the argument made by Edie Windsor was “that 
DOMA violates the guarantee of equal protection, as applied to the 
Federal Government through the Fifth Amendment.”94 The Court’s 
holding, in turn, reflected the plaintiffs’ articulation of the issues, 
while also spelling out the liberty component of the equal protection 
violation. Specifically, the Court held on the merits that DOMA 
“violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable 
to the federal government. . . . By seeking to displace [the State’s 
protection for same-sex married couples] and treating those persons as 
living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.”95 
By basing its finding of unconstitutionality on Fifth Amendment 
due process and equal protection grounds rather than Tenth 
Amendment federalism grounds, the Windsor Court “dodged a 
bullet,” and “[w]hile its acceptance would have brought along the 
short-term gain of providing a basis for invalidating DOMA, it also 
would have curtailed the ability of federal officials to protect same-sex 
couples and other families”96 in future cases. On some level, the Court 
may have been tempted by federalism and flirted with it long enough 
in the majority opinion to confuse some into viewing the decision as a 
 
92. See generally Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307). 
93. See generally Marcus, supra note 13 (examining the history of privacy 
rights in Supreme Court jurisprudence).  
94. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
95. Id. at 2693, 2696. 
96. Joslin, supra note 70, at 158.  
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federalist decision. However, such an interpretation of Windsor would 
be a misreading, for the reasons set forth in the following Part. In the 
end, Justice Kennedy was not swayed in Windsor from the equal 
liberty foundation he had carefully laid in the preceding LGBT rights 
cases for the marriage equality case that finally arrived in the form of 
Windsor, and will likely reemerge in the near future.  
II. Why Windsor Is Not a Federalist Decision 
When the Windsor decision was released, perhaps having been 
conditioned to anticipate a federalist decision on DOMA, a number of 
scholars,97 practitioners,98 journalists,99 and a couple of lower courts100  
97. See, e.g., id. at 158 n.15 (“‘Much of the DOMA decision’s reasoning is 
based on federalism considerations.’”) (citation omitted); Katie Eyer, 
Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 Yale L.J. Online 197, 
214 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/9/15/eyer.html (“Drawing 
widely on seemingly sui generis federalism and liberty-based reasoning, 
the Court offered virtually no guidance on how its reasoning might be 
applied to future cases, either in the equal protection context or 
elsewhere.”); see also Rick Hills, Windsor and the States’ Power to 
Define Federal Constitutional Rights: Does Kennedy Revive Justice 
Harlan’s Theory of Rights?, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 26, 2013, 11:51 AM) 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/windsor-and-the-
states-power-to-define-federal-constitutionalrights.html (“For federalism 
fans, the most interesting aspect of Windsor is its recognition that state 
law can define, at least in part, the scope of federal constitutional rights 
by (for instance) defining what constitutes an arbitrary classification 
under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause.”); Damon Root, 
Federalism and Liberty in the Supreme Court’s Gay Marriage Cases, 
REASON.COM: HIT & RUN BLOG (June 26, 2013, 12:17 PM), 
http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/26/federalism-and-liberty-in-the-
supreme-co (“In his majority opinion today invaliding Section 3 of the 
1996 Defense of Marriage Act, Justice Anthony Kennedy employed two 
of the most common themes in his jurisprudence: federalism and 
liberty.”).  
98. Scott Lauck et al., Future of Marriage in Missouri No Clearer After 
Supreme Court Ruling, MO. LAWYERS MEDIA, June 28, 2013, available 
at 2013 WLNR 16319428. 
99. See, e.g., Jerry Elmer, United States v. Windsor: Another Victory for 
Gay Rights, R.I.B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 13, 16 (“[T]he closest the 
majority decision comes to stating a doctrinal basis for its ruling is 
federalism.”); James Oliphant, Supreme Court Rulings on Gay 
Marriage: A Liberal Result Wrapped in Conservative Values, NAT’L J., 
(June 26, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/supre
me-court-rulings-on-gay-marriage-a-liberal-result-wrapped-in-
conservative-values-20130626; Editorial, From the High Court, a Victory 
for Federalism, KEY W. CITIZEN, July 1, 2013, at 4a. 
100. See Robicheaux v. Caldwell, CIV.A. 13-5090, 2014 WL 4347099 (E.D. 
La. Sept. 3, 2014) (“Windsor leaves unchanged ‘the concerns for state 
diversity and sovereignty.’”); Com. Dep’t of Health v. Hanes, No. 379 
M.D. 2013, 2013 WL 5469566 at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 12, 2013) 
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identified Windsor as a federalist decision. The vast majority of 
federal courts—other than the lone above-cited Louisiana district 
court judge—applying Windsor to same-sex marriage equality claims 
since the decision, however, have rejected such a federalist 
interpretation.101 
 Interestingly, Windsor’s dissenting justices themselves were 
divided on whether Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion from which 
they were dissenting was based on federalism. On the one hand, Chief 
Justice Roberts’s dissent, for example, describes the majority opinion 
as “undeniabl[y] . . . based on federalism.”102 Similarly, while not 
labeling the majority opinion a federalist opinion, Justice Alito’s 
dissent “wholeheartedly” agrees “[t]o the extent that the Court takes 
the position that the question of same-sex marriage should be resolved 
primarily at the state level.”103 On the other hand, Justice Scalia 
seemed to think that Chief Justice Roberts was fooled by the majority 
into thinking of its opinion as a federalist decision, writing, “the 
opinion starts with seven full pages about the traditional power of 
States to define domestic relations—initially fooling many readers, I 
am sure, into thinking that this is a federalism opinion.”104 Elsewhere 
in his dissent, Scalia suggests that the majority opinion is part equal 
protection, part due process, and part “amorphous federalism.”105  
However, as Justice Scalia himself recognizes in the first 
comment, Windsor is not at its core a federalist decision. As the vast 
majority of federal courts applying Windsor have recognized, and for  
(ordering rogue clerk to stop issuing marriage license to same-sex couple 
and describing Windsor in the following terms: “Because the regulation 
of marriage is a matter for the states, the Supreme Court found that a 
federal definition of marriage that creates ‘two contradictory marriage 
regimes within the same State’ must fall. Congress ‘interfered’ with 
‘state sovereign choices’ about who may be married by creating its own 
definition, relegating one set of marriages—same-sex marriages—to the 
‘second-tier,’ making them ‘unequal.’” (citing United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)).  
101. See supra section II.B., discussing Bostic v. Schaefer, Nos. 14–1167, 14–
1169, 14–1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014); Kitchen v. 
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1207 (10th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 1:13-CV-
00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014); Bishop v. 
United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 
116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 
982, 997 (W.D. Wis. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 
(E.D. Va. 2014). 
102. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
103. Id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. at 2707. For a thorough discussion of “amorphous federalism,” see 
David B. Cruz, “Amorphous Federalism” and the Supreme Court’s 
Marriage Cases, 59 Loyola L. Rev. ___ (2014) (forthcoming). 
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the reasons set forth below as well, Windsor reasonably cannot be 
read as a federalist decision affirming an exclusive state power to 
regulate marriage unchecked by federal judicial review. 
A. About Those “Seven Full Pages . . .” 
Justice Scalia offers the following as a reason that some might 
interpret Windsor’s majority opinion as a federalism opinion: “the 
opinion starts with seven full pages about the traditional power of 
States to define domestic relations—initially fooling many readers, I 
am sure, into thinking that this is a federalism opinion.”106 However, 
this statement by Scalia is somewhat misleading. 
Seven pages is not an accurate page count of the majority 
opinion’s state powers discussion, which only takes up two pages out 
of the fourteen-paged final reported version of the Windsor majority 
opinion.107 The seven-page tally cited by Scalia clearly came from the 
slip opinion, in which the discussion did total seven pages out of 
twenty-six.108 However, as a seasoned Supreme Court Justice, Justice 
Scalia should certainly know that the final reported version of the 
decision would contain a different, much less lengthy, pagination than 
the slip copy circulated among the Justices, and that both Bluebook 
rules and his own Court’s instructions on citation require citing to the 
reporter, not the slip opinion, particularly where they conflict in some 
manner.109 By instead emphasizing the slip opinion’s higher page 
number tally in order to emphasize how much ink the majority had 
devoted to an issue, despite the certain knowledge that the final 
version of the opinion would be much shorter in terms of pagination, 
Scalia’s dissent could give the impression that half of the majority’s 
opinion (which was fourteen pages in final reported form) was devoted 
to federalism, not a mere two out of fourteen pages. As such, Scalia 
arguably engages in a bit of trickery in his exaggeration of the 
section’s length in order to make a rhetorical point, and his 
accusation of foolery by the majority might just be a case of the pot 
calling the kettle black.  
B. Windsor’s Loving Reminder of the Primacy of Individual Rights 
Another reason that Windsor’s two-page state powers discussion 
does not render Windsor a federalist opinion lies in Justice Kennedy’s 
pointed citation of Loving v. Virginia, which immediately prefaces the 
 
106. Windsor, at 2705.  
107. See id. at 2691–93 (majority opinion). 
108. United States v. Windsor, No.12-307, slip op. (U.S. 2013).  
109. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R.B4.1.2, at 9 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010); 2013 Term 
Opinions of the Court, Sup. Ct. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
opinions/slipopinions.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
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state powers discussion.110 Specifically, the Windsor majority opinion 
contains the following cautionary language immediately before 
launching into its state powers discussion:  
[I]t is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power and 
authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition. 
State laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must 
respect the constitutional rights of persons, but, subject to those 
guarantees, “regulation of domestic relations” is “an area that 
has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the 
States.”111  
Thus, the Court in Windsor did not describe the issue of marriage 
law as so exclusively within the province of state legislation that it 
falls outside the scope of federal judicial review even when it affects 
individual constitutional rights. To the contrary, the majority 
opinion’s reference to Loving frames and limits its ensuing state 
powers discussion in a manner that should remind the reader that 
while state legislative powers may trump federal legislative powers in 
some cases, constitutional rights may still be protected against state 
infringement by the federal judiciary. The Court’s powers of judicial 
review over unconstitutional state legislation are not limited by 
federalism. Rather, judicial review is a limitation upon federalism.  
The critical significance of the Windsor Court’s citation to Loving 
and its emphasis that state marriage laws may not violate 
fundamental individual rights has not been lost on the federal courts 
that have applied Windsor to subsequent marriage equality cases.  
For example, in the first federal marriage equality decision 
following Windsor, the Northern District of Oklahoma in Bishop v. 
United States ex rel. Holder112 emphasized Windsor’s repeated use of 
“the disclaimer ‘subject to constitutional guarantees’” and described 
Windsor’s citation to Loving as “a disclaimer of enormous 
proportion.”113 Continuing with an explanation of the Constitution’s 
individual rights limits upon federalism, Bishop continued: “Arguably, 
the ‘state rights’ portion of the Windsor decision stands for the 
unremarkable proposition that a state has broad authority to regulate 
marriage, so long as it does not violate its citizens’ federal 
constitutional rights.”114 Other federal district courts addressing 
 
110. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (majority opinion) (citing Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
111. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)) 
(citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 87). 
112.  No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014). 
113. Id. at *18 (emphasis added) (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692). 
114. Id. 
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challenges to same-sex marriage bans have followed suit, similarly 
concluding that the Windsor decision was based on individual rights, 
not federalist principles.115 
Federal appeals courts have likewise rejected efforts to paint 
Windsor as a federalist decision that leaves the determination of 
same-sex marriage rights up to the states. In Kitchen v. Herbert,116 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the appellants’ federalism 
argument, explaining,  
 
The Windsor Court concluded it was “unnecessary to decide 
whether” DOMA “is a violation of the Constitution because it 
disrupts the federal balance.” Rather than relying on federalism 
principles, the Court framed the question presented as whether 
the “injury and indignity” caused by DOMA “is a deprivation 
of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.”117 
 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly explained in Bostic 
v. Schaefer118 that although the Windsor decision was in part based 
“on the Supreme Court’s respect for states’ supremacy in the 
domestic relations sphere,” the Court in Windsor did not, however, 
“lament that section 3 had usurped states’ authority over marriage 
due to its desire to safeguard federalism . . . . Its concern sprung from 
 
115. See Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (“[T]he Court declined 
expressly to rely on federalism as a basis for its conclusion that DOMA 
is unconstitutional.”); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (“This 
Court remains mindful that the federal intervention is best exercised 
rarely, and that the powers regarding domestic relations properly rest 
with the good offices of state and local government. This deference is 
appropriate, and even essential. However, federal courts have 
intervened, properly, when state regulations have infringed upon the 
right to marry. The Windsor Court prefaced its analysis about deference 
to the state laws defining and regulating marriage by citing Loving’s 
holding that recognized that ‘of course,’ such laws ‘must respect the 
constitutional rights of persons.’”) (citations omitted); Latta v. Otter, 
2014 WL 1909999 at *11 (“‘[F]ederalism’ is no answer where, as here, 
individuals claim their state government has trampled their 
constitutional rights. Indeed, Windsor also recognizes the transcendent 
quality of individual constitutional rights, even when those rights 
conflict with a state’s traditional sovereign authority. ‘State laws 
defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect the 
constitutional rights of persons, see, e.g., Loving . . . .’ Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2691” (emphasis added)). 
116. 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). 
117. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1207 (10th Cir. 2014). 
118. 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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section 3’s creation of two classes of married couples within 
states that had legalized same-sex marriage. . . .”119  
Therefore, it has been widely recognized that the Windsor 
decision is ultimately an affirmation of individual rights, not state 
rights. As with Loving, even if an area of legislation, such as marriage 
law, is traditionally left to the states rather than dictated by 
Congress, state law does not trump federal law for purposes of 
exempting state legislation from federal judicial review. The United 
States Constitution is still the supreme law of the land, with the 
Federal Constitution setting forth limits on both federal and state 
power.120 As such, individual federal constitutional rights still reign 
supreme in some cases, including in the case of either federal or state 
attempts to carve out a class of persons for the deprivation of 
fundamental rights, including marriage.121 As previously explained, 
federalism can be a sword used by the State against federal legislative 
intrusion, but it is not a shield the state may use to exempt itself 
from federal constitutional mandates.122  
The Court’s citation to Loving in Windsor signals that the state 
powers discussion that follows the Loving citation should in no 
manner be viewed as granting states unbridled authority to define 
marriage in a way that unconstitutionally discriminates against 
members of disfavored groups. In a future decision, the Court should 
specify the extent to which laws limiting marriage rights by the sex of 
one’s intended spouse are analogous to the laws struck down in 
Loving that limited marriage rights by the race of one’s intended 
spouse. Loving will ultimately be a difficult case for same-sex marriage 
opponents to distinguish, as will other cases in which the Court has 
affirmed the fundamental right to marry in other contexts, even for 
prisoners, who give up many rights upon conviction and 
incarceration.123 Regardless of the ultimate outcome of a future 
 
119. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 378 (4th Cir. 2014). 
120. U.S. Const. art. VI. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
121. See generally Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (holding that “[m]arriage is one of the 
‘basis civil rights of man’” and that “[u]nder our Constitution, the 
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with 
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State”).  
122. See supra Part II.B. 
123. See generally Marcus, supra note 13, at 418–34 (discussing the 
precedential value of Loving for future same-sex marriage cases, as well 
as that of Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), which affirmed a 
fundamental right to marry regardless of an individual’s record of 
delinquent child support payments and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 
(1987), which affirmed a fundamental right to marry regardless of 
prisoner status). 
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challenge to state same-sex marriage bans, Windsor’s citation to 
Loving, emphasizing the primacy of fundamental individual marriage 
rights over discriminatory state and federal laws, sets the stage for 
such a future marriage equality determination, rather than  
precluding it. 
C. Federalism Discussed Solely in Context of Evaluating  
DOMA’s Stated Justifications 
None of this is to say that the two-page state powers discussion 
commencing with the Loving citation in Windsor is insubstantial. 
Constituting nearly a quarter of the majority opinion’s analysis 
section, although not half of the whole opinion as Scalia’s misleading 
page count could imply,124 it clearly has some significance. However, 
as previously discussed, the Court’s substantial discussion of 
federalism principles does not mean that state legislation on marriage 
is immune from federal judicial review; the Loving citation is a 
pointed reminder of this fundamental principle of constitutional law. 
So what does the state powers passage mean? 
The Court’s purpose in inserting a state power analysis into an 
individual rights decision is revealed when one examines the 
surrounding context of the Court’s federalist discussion, namely, the 
Court’s scrutiny of the government’s purpose in enacting DOMA.125 
By holding DOMA up to the light of longstanding federalism 
principles giving federal deference to state marriage laws, the Court 
unveiled a profound incongruity between traditional federalist respect 
and DOMA’s utter lack of respect for state marriage laws. The Court 
concluded that this incongruity was evidence of a constitutionally 
suspect purpose. Specifically, the Court found that “DOMA’s unusual 
deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state 
definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of 
the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition 
of their marriages.”126 After citing both Romer and a second “rational 
basis plus” case in which legislation motivated by animus failed to 
pass constitutional muster even under the rational basis test, the 
Court then concluded that that deviation, in turn, served as “strong 
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of  
that class.”127 
This analysis by the Court mirrors the First Circuit’s 
Massachusetts analysis that employed what Professor Joslin described 
 
124. See supra Part II.B. 
125. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–95 (2013).  
126. Id. at 2693.  
127. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); Dept. of 
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)). 
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as the “unusualness trigger theory.”128 It also parallels the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion in Windsor that “[b]ecause DOMA is an 
unprecedented breach of longstanding deference to federalism that 
singles out same-sex marriage as the only inconsistency (among many) 
in state law that requires a federal rule to achieve uniformity, the 
rationale premised on uniformity is not an exceedingly persuasive 
justification.”129 
However, whereas the Court of Appeals in Windsor had, in effect, 
applied the unusualness trigger theory in direct response to the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group’s (BLAG’s)130 argument that 
DOMA was justified by the need for a federal rule achieving 
uniformity in marriage laws,131 the Supreme Court in Windsor did not 
give BLAG’s “uniformity” justification enough credence to even 
articulate it explicitly. Rather, the Court conducted an independent 
inquiry into what the purpose of DOMA was and made three 
interrelated findings about DOMA’s stated purpose, its demonstrated 
purpose, and its principal purpose.  
First, as to the “stated purpose” of DOMA, the Court quoted the 
Congressional Record’s House Report statement “that DOMA 
expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral 
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional 
(especially Judeo–Christian) morality,’” and concluded that “[t]he 
stated purpose of the law was to promote an ‘interest in protecting 
the traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage 
laws.’ Were there any doubt of this far-reaching purpose, the title of 
the Act confirms it: The Defense of Marriage Act.”132 Second, as to 
the “demonstrated purpose,” the Court explained that both the 
arguments by BLAG and the title and dynamics of the bill revealed 
that “[t]he Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State 
decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated 
as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law. This raises a 
most serious question under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.”133 
Note here the lack of similar reference to the Tenth Amendment. 
Third, as to the “principal purpose,” after describing a principal effect 
of imposing inequality on a subset of marriages otherwise sanctioned 
under state law, the Court concluded that DOMA’s “principal 
 
128. See supra Part I.B.  
129. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 186 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d 133 
S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
130. See supra note 68. 
131. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185–86.  
132. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 16 
(1996)). 
133. Id. at 2693–94. 
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purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like 
governmental efficiency.”134 
While the Supreme Court declined to pay even lip service to the 
uniformity justification, the higher Court’s opinion nonetheless 
mirrored that of the Second Circuit in a more critical respect: its use 
of a vertical separation of powers analysis in support of a separate 
horizontal separation of powers conclusion. The Court, in essence, 
used principles of traditional federal legislative deference to state 
legislative areas including marriage laws (vertical separation of 
powers), to illuminate how BLAG’s justifications for DOMA were 
constitutionally suspect. That vertical analysis, in turn, established 
grounds for increased scrutiny in federal judicial review over a 
discriminatory Act of Congress (horizontal separation of powers). By 
engaging multiple levels of constitutional law jurisprudence, the Court 
concluded that unconstitutional animus may be inferred from the 
federal government’s glaringly unprecedented intervention in an area 
of law generally left to state determination under federalist 
principles.135  
It is critical to understand that this conclusion that deviation 
from federalist norms evidences animus, triggering a higher degree of 
scrutiny, is not the same as a conclusion that DOMA is 
unconstitutional because it violates federalist principles. This 
distinction is evident in the Court’s explanation that “it is 
unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is 
a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance. 
The State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central 
relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism.”136 
Here, the Court unambiguously explains that its discussion of 
DOMA’s unusual federal intrusion on state power was relevant not for 
the purpose of determining whether DOMA unconstitutionally 
violated federalism principles but was relevant for another reason 
altogether. It then proceeded to spell out that other reason in terms of 
the decision’s primary individual rights analysis:  
[T]he State’s decision to give [same-sex couples] the right to 
marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense 
import. When the State used its historic and essential authority 
to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its power 
in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and 
protection of the class in their own community. DOMA, because 
of its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition 
of reliance on state law to define marriage. “[D]iscriminations of 
 
134. Id. at 2694. 
135. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691–92. 
136. Id. at 2692 (emphasis added). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise 
1106 
an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to 
determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional 
provision.”137  
In other words, the Court’s analysis of state powers in the context 
of marriage laws was relevant for purposes of identifying a deviation 
from usual federalist deference, which, in turn evidences 
“discrimination[] of an unusual character” warranting close scrutiny.138 
However, the deviation from federalist principles does not amount to 
a Tenth Amendment violation in and of itself establishing 
unconstitutionality.139 Rather, the Fifth Amendment’s due process and 
equal protection guarantees are what formed the basis of Windsor’s 
ultimate individual rights holding, as described below.140  
D. Textualist Reading of Unambiguous Holding Reveals  
an Individual Rights Fifth Amendment Holding,  
Not a Federalist Tenth Amendment Holding 
The text of Windsor’s holding itself unambiguously cites the 
Fifth, not the Tenth, Amendment, yet another clear indicator that 
the decision is at its core an individual rights decision, not a 
federalism decision.  
The majority opinion presents its ultimate holding both at the 
beginning of its analysis and at the end. The Court’s first articulation 
of the holding is that DOMA “violates basic due process and equal 
protection principles applicable to the federal government.”141 The 
holding is then repeated at the end of the opinion as follows: “By 
seeking to displace [the State’s protection for same-sex married 
couples] and treating those persons as living in marriages less 
respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.”142 
Thus, the text of the Court’s holding unambiguously references 
the Fifth Amendment, not the Tenth, and clearly indicates that the 
 
137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Romer, v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 
(1996)). 
138. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Joslin, supra note 70, at 163 (discussing 
“unusualness trigger theory”). 
139. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
140. As Professor Cruz points out, the only question presented in the 
Government’s certiorari petitions was the question of whether Section 3 
of DOMA violates equal protection, not whether it violates the 
Constitution’s federalism provisions, and the “Supreme Court is only 
supposed to decide that question or subsidiary questions ‘fairly included 
therein.’” See Cruz, supra note 105, at 30.  
141. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
142. Id. at 2696. 
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Court’s decision is one based on a finding of due process and equal 
protection, i.e., individual rights, violations. State powers and 
federalism are not even mentioned in the Court’s articulations of  
its holding. 
E. Court Details Examples of Federal Legislation in Area of Marriage 
One final indicia of Windsor’s not being a federalist opinion is the 
Court’s explicit affirmation of Congress’ authority to enact statutes 
bearing on marriage rights and privileges.143 As examples, Windsor 
cites federal preemption of state laws through a federal program 
giving a former spouse priority in retaining life insurance proceeds 
under formal beneficiary designation rules;144 immigration laws 
pertaining to the treatment of noncitizen marriages regardless of 
relevant state law;145 and the federal statutes setting forth the income-
based Social Security benefit criteria, reflecting Congress’ decision 
“that although state law would determine in general who qualifies as 
an applicant’s spouse, common-law marriages also should be 
recognized, regardless of any particular State’s view on these 
relationships.”146 These examples from the Court reinforce the 
limitations of federalism, under which, the Court explains, even 
legislative actions by the federal government may in some cases 
substantially affect and even regulate legal areas generally left to state 
legislatures. 
For all of the above reasons, Justice Scalia may claim that 
Windsor deceptively quacks like a federalist duck, and Chief Justice 
Roberts may claim the decision is a federalist duck, but the decision 
is in fact not a federalist duck at all but is something else entirely.  
III. Why, Despite Quacking Like a Duck,  
Windsor Is Actually a Swan Song for  
Federalist-Based Marriage Discrimination  
In the end, while Windsor may emit slight federalist duck quacks, 
I propose that Windsor is actually a swan song for federalism-based 
marriage discrimination. I have elsewhere written of the inevitability 
of a Supreme Court decision recognizing that the deep-rooted 
fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choice applies equally 
to members of same-sex couples across the country.147 Its inevitability 
 
143. Id. at 2690. 
144. Id. (citing Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013); Ridgway v. 
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950)). 
145. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) (2012)). 
146. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2) (2006)). 
147. See generally Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal 
Liberty, Not “Argle Bargle”: The Inevitability of Marriage Equality 
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results from the precedential doctrinal grounds set by past Supreme 
Court cases, from Romer and Lawrence to other personal autonomy 
cases, ultimately enabling the Court to “strik[e] down same-sex 
marriage bans as universally as Loving [v. Virginia] struck down 
interracial marriage bans, with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses united to provide 
equal liberty guarantees for same-sex couples and their families.”148  
In Windsor, building upon the precedent of Romer—which struck 
down a broad state constitutional amendment singling out LGBT 
individuals for the denial of civil rights protections—the Court 
concluded that DOMA analogously “writes inequality into the entire 
United States Code.”149 The Windsor Court emphatically reiterated 
Romer’s admonition that “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality 
‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm 
a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of 
that group.”150  
Following the precedent of Lawrence, the Windsor Court 
explained that DOMA unconstitutionally undermined the state of 
New York’s attempt to accord equal liberty protections to same-sex 
unions, “for it tells those couples, and all the world, that their 
otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition. This 
places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-
tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral 
and sexual choices the Constitution protects.”151 
Finally, in citing Loving, as previously discussed, the Windsor 
Court issued a powerful reminder of the limits of federalism when 
states abuse their power to discriminate against individuals, 
particularly in the context of fundamental marriage rights152—not that 
the precedential grounds for Windsor and future marriage equality 
cases started with Loving; to the contrary, the foundation for 
autonomy and equal liberty in the recognition of intimate 
partnerships has roots as far back as nineteenth-century case law.153 
 
After Windsor, 23 Tul. J. L. & Sexuality 17 (2014); Nancy C. 
Marcus, Beyond Romer, supra note 13, at 416–20.  
148. Marcus, Argle Bargle, supra note 147. 
149. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
150. Id. at 2693 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
(1973)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
151. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003)). 
152. See supra Part II.B. 
153. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 371–78 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis 
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)); see 
also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
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Furthermore, the constitutional history of judicial review is replete 
with examples of the United States Constitution serving as the 
ultimate buffer against the abuse of state power in the exercise of 
discriminatory treatment and classifications of individuals, whether in 
the name of federalism or otherwise. Nor is Windsor’s reverse 
incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees 
into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause unprecedented. 
Although the Fifth Amendment’s text may not contain an explicit 
equal protection clause, the “Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment 
equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal 
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”154 This is 
because, the Court has recognized, “the Constitution imposes upon 
federal, state, and local governmental actors the same obligation to 
respect the personal right to equal protection of the laws.”155 Windsor 
merely builds upon these precedents to affirm that principle in a 
context and manner establishing protections of LGBT individuals and 
same-sex couples specifically from discriminatory abuses of federal and 
state power alike. 
As to the transformation of ducks into a swan song for federalism-
based marriage discrimination, Windsor’s federalist-seeming analysis 
actually sets the stage for the demise of federalist-justified state 
denials of equal marriage rights to same-sex couples. The Court in 
Windsor held that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York [a 
state recognizing same-sex marriages] seeks to protect. By doing so it 
violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to 
the Federal Government.”156 That this holding should apply equally to 
state governments engaging in the same sort of discrimination is made 
evident by the Court’s abundant references throughout the Fifth 
Amendment opinion to Fourteenth Amendment cases such as Loving, 
Romer, and Lawrence. Its incorporation of these Fourteenth 
Amendment cases into its analysis illustrates that the same doctrines 
apply under either Amendment.  
Windsor serves as the latest and most explicit reminder, 
consistent with this longstanding principle, that although state powers 
may come before federal powers in some contexts, the Ninth 
Amendment (rights reserved to the people) still comes before the 
Tenth (powers reserved to the states). In this respect, Windsor 
ultimately stands for the limitation on both federal and state 
legislative power to engage in class-based, unequal deprivation of 
 
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 
(1886)).  
154. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).  
155. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231–32 (1995). 
156. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
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substantive due process rights, including the right of same-sex 
married couples to receive equal respect for their marriages. 
If Windsor’s recitation of federalist principles were, as Justice 
Scalia cynically charged, an attempt to fool the reader,157 this would 
be a case of strategic artifice by the Court, resulting in an opinion in 
which things are quite the opposite of what they seem. Windsor could 
be viewed as a case in which, in the name of limiting federal power, 
the Court reaffirmed the broadest power of all—that of  
judicial review.  
We have seen such strategic rhetorical maneuvering before. Recall 
the original Supreme Court case affirming the power of federal judicial 
review over the constitutionality of legislation: the parallel between 
Windsor and Marbury v. Madison158 is quite striking, when one steps 
back to examine Windsor in this light. In Marbury, Justice Marshall, 
the Supreme Court’s fourth Chief Justice, engaged in a substantial 
discussion of the extent and limitations of federal judicial power, for 
the purpose of explaining why the Court lacked original jurisdiction to 
issue writs of mandamus under Article III.159 However, on a deeper 
and more important level, this explanation of the limits of the Court’s 
power turned into an affirmation of the greatest of federal judicial 
powers—that of judicial review, with Marshall declaring the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 unconstitutional.160 Until Marbury v. Madison, which was 
thus written in terms of limiting judicial power even while effectively 
serving to broaden that power, there had not been a similar explicit 
declaration by the Court that “[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the [J]udicial [D]epartment to say what the law is,”161 and 
that the power of judicial review accordingly provides the authority of 
the Supreme Court to strike a statute in conflict with the Supreme 
Law of the Land, i.e., the Constitution. 
Is Justice Marshall to be condemned for what, in the eyes of a 
cynic, might be viewed as a power grab through rhetorical artifice in 
Marbury v. Madison? By engaging in a historically revolutionary 
power grab in the name of limiting the Court’s power, was he guilty 
of the very type of duplicitousness with which he charged critics of 
judicial review, writing in Marbury that such critics “would be giving 
to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same 
breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow 
limits”?162 
 
157. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
158. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
159. Id. at 168–80. 
160. Id. at 180. 
161. Id. at 177. 
162. Id. at 178. 
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Or was he merely striking a balance between articulating the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional restraints, while also recognizing the 
power of judicial review that was already inherent in the early 
structure of our constitutional democracy and its judicial structures?  
Is Justice Kennedy, over two centuries later, fairly subject to 
parallel criticism? Has he tried to pull a fast one, first in Lawrence, as 
Justice Scalia charged in his dissent in that opinion,163 and again in 
Windsor, attempting to mask his more ambitious intent in both cases 
of enabling a future sweeping same-sex marriage decision that will 
secure him a heroic spot in history?164 
Both questions may be answered the same way. Perhaps, in each 
case, the ends justify the means. In the case of Marbury, it was 
necessary to pay lip service to judicial humility to soften the force of 
the most powerful assumption of judicial power in the Court’s 
history—the power of judicial review that is now generally accepted 
as necessary and important for the protection of federal constitutional 
rights and delineation of constitutional checks and balances of 
governmental powers. Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s LGBT rights 
opinions may be viewed as having created a carefully constructed 
stage for the final act of marriage equality jurisprudence, each adding 
an additional foundation for more bold opinions down the road, secure 
in the precedents set by Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor. And while 
clever, and at times indirect, these doctrinal foundations are not a 
matter of play but are the serious and studied work of a Supreme  
163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At the 
end of its opinion—after having laid waste the foundations of our 
rational-basis jurisprudence—the Court says that the present case ‘does 
not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any 
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.’ Do not believe it.” 
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority opinion)). 
164. Running with this cynical view for a moment, a tangential literary 
comparison begs to be made to Kennedy’s and Marshall’s possible 
parallel strategies of rhetorical artifice. Such a political power grab 
disguised as the opposite, committed through clever, rhetorical 
wordsmithing, also is displayed in at least one other political context: 
the Shakespearean telling of the aftermath of Julius Caesar’s 
assassination, in the form of Marc Antony’s famous “Friends, Romans, 
Countrymen, I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him” speech. 
William Shakespeare, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2. In that speech, 
again in the name of humility and honoring the limits of power, Antony 
effects the seizure of power from Brutus even while paying him lip 
service as “an honorable man,” in order to avenge the slain Julius 
Caesar, from whom he distanced himself rhetorically even as, between 
the lines, he avenged his murder and reclaimed power from his slayers. 
Id. Just like the aforementioned opinions by Justices Marshall and 
Kennedy, the speech by Shakespeare’s Marc Antony could be viewed as 
engaging in a strategically savvy claim to power through manipulative 
rhetoric that accomplishes the opposite of what, on the surface, it seems 
to say at first glance.  
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Court Justice writing what he truly believes, in furtherance of what 
he just as sincerely believes to be his duty to the Constitution and  
the country. 
IV. Beyond Minimalism: Foundation-Building 
Jurisprudence as a Giant Leap, Not Small Step, 
Toward Significant Evolutions in Rights Protections 
In some respects, Windsor presents the most solid foundation to 
date of any Supreme Court case addressing LGBT issues, as it sets 
forth substantial limitations upon government abuses of power, for 
the ultimate and primary purposes of protecting fundamental 
individual liberty interests. Further, by acknowledging both liberty 
and equality components of same-sex marriage protections, under the 
Fifth as well as the Fourteen Amendment, Windsor, as an equal 
liberty decision, bridges doctrines and unifies principles and 
precedents into an increasingly clearer equal liberty doctrine for the 
twenty-first century. 
Even among LGBT rights and marriage equality allies, there are 
those stragglers from the minimalist camp who may shudder at such 
lofty principle-based doctrinal evolutions as a basis for a line of cases 
involving politically heated issues. The unapologetic development of 
a more coherent twenty-first century equal liberty doctrine through a 
foundation-building jurisprudence is more akin to a giant leap than 
a small step toward significant constitutional rights protections. 
But why, if not engaging in artifice, do Justice Kennedy’s LGBT-
rights opinions fail to own up to the tremendous precedential import 
each of them has in paving the path toward future cases protecting 
equal liberties of LGBT individuals? Why was the Court so careful to 
disclaim in the Lawrence opinion that that case “[did] not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any 
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter,”165 and in Windsor 
that “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful 
marriages [performed in states recognizing same-sex marriage],”166 
both times prompting Justice Scalia to roll his eyes in response with 
accusations of foul play and trickery?167 As Scalia predicted, Lawrence 
did indeed become a building block for a future opinion affirming 
same-sex marriage rights.168 Underscoring the connection between the 
two cases is the fact that Windsor was decided not just on the last 
 
165. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority opinion). 
166. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
167. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
168. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604.  
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day of the Court’s term in 2013, but ten years to the very date that 
Lawrence had been decided.  
There are several possible explanations for Justice Kennedy’s 
serving up cautionary narrowing language and failing to explicitly 
flesh out the extent of the rights affirmed in his opinions that are 
otherwise breathtaking in their strong articulation of constitutional 
principles and protections of LGBT individuals.169 First, there is a 
perceived jurisprudential preference among jurists to decide cases on 
narrow grounds.170 Perhaps influenced by this, Justice Kennedy, even 
while issuing doctrinally powerful decisions in LGBT rights cases, 
nonetheless has been tempered by this culture of encouraging a 
narrow framing of decisions, if only to garner the most votes among 
one’s colleagues on the bench. Second, Justice Kennedy may be acting 
out of a sense of political fairness, expedience, or even ambivalence, 
well aware that he is the swing vote on the bench, the balance of 
which may shift against marriage equality if, for example, the 
Republicans win the White House in 2016 and a departing Justice 
Ginsburg is replaced by a more conservative justice.171 Perhaps the 
pressure of being the swing vote is too much, and he is stalling, 
waiting to see how the future composition of the Court might change 
and determine the future of same-sex marriage adjudication, leaving  
169. On the latter point, the Bishop court in the 2014 Oklahoma 
constitutional amendment case stated, “There is no precise legal label 
for what has occurred in Supreme Court jurisprudence beginning with 
Romer in 1996 and culminating in Windsor in 2013, but this Court 
knows a rhetorical shift when it sees one.” Bishop v. United States ex 
rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013, at *33 (N.D. 
Okla. Jan. 14, 2014). 
170. “[T]he appropriate exercise of judicial power requires that important 
constitutional issues not be decided unnecessarily where narrower 
grounds exist for according relief. This consideration applies even 
though such grounds are not raised in the jurisdictional submissions.” 
Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 451 n.1 (1974) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (citing Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 
(1960); Barr v. Matteo, 355 U.S. 171, 172 (1957)). See also Craig Green, 
Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at War, 
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 99, 114 (2006) (describing “the modern Court’s 
preference for narrow reasoning”); Michael F. Perry, Recent 
Development, Avoiding Mead: The Problem with Unanimity in Long 
Island Care at Home, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1183, 1183–84 
(2008) (describing “Chief Justice Roberts’s announced preference for 
narrow and unanimous opinions”).  
171. As a matter of politics and procedure, it will now be more difficult for 
any party to block judicial nominees, now that the Democrats have 
exercised the “nuclear option” of eliminating judicial nomination 
filibusters altogether. See David Welna, With Nominees Stalled, 
Democrats Reprise Filibuster Threat, NPR: IT’S ALL POLitics (Nov. 
20, 2013, 6:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/11/20
/246394094/with-nominees-stalled-democrats-reprise-filibuster-threat. 
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the decision, ultimately, up to the voters to decide rather than 
bearing the burden himself. 
Justice Kennedy’s motivation in throwing both federalism-like 
and narrowing language into Windsor, which is otherwise a powerful 
opinion affirming broad equal liberty principles, may be related to the 
minimalist movement’s lingering, if diminished, impact on the Court. 
With several amicus briefs filed on the side of the LGBT litigants in 
the Supreme Court marriage cases urging a more narrow or 
conservative approach, the pressure was on the Court to refrain from 
issuing too broad an opinion. Had Windsor been even more sweeping 
and lofty in tone than it already was, perhaps Kennedy felt it would 
have risked either causing overt backlash or simply not being taken as 
seriously. Instead, by writing an opinion that was more moderate in 
tone, honoring both conservative principles of minimalist narrow 
adjudication and federalism (at least on the surface) and doctrinally 
liberal principles of equal liberty, Kennedy struck a careful but not 
overly cautious balance honoring the different voices and concerns 
raised in the context of a controversial social issue.  
Justice Kennedy may have sent mixed signals in tempering both 
Lawrence and Windsor with language affecting a cautious tone 
without significantly limiting the precedential force of those cases. 
Nonetheless, even if such careful writing is to be described as artifice, 
it is acceptable artifice, cautiously building for the greater good, 
brick-by-brick and layer-by-layer, the most solid, carefully constructed 
doctrinal basis for future marriage equality and other equal liberty 
decisions possible, anticipating and answering objections from various 
critics even as the architecture for a new era of equality is put  
into place.  
Just as Windsor is not truly a federalist decision, neither is it 
truly a narrow or minimalist decision when viewed in its entirety, 
limiting language and federalism lip service aside. Justice Kennedy 
went farther than he had to in authoring Windsor’s affirmance of the 
Second Circuit’s decision in several respects. Although federalism was 
not the approach argued by Edie Windsor, Kennedy did not have to 
go beyond the federalism argument offered by amici that marriage is 
traditionally an issue left to the States, rendering DOMA an 
unconstitutional trouncing of state sovereignty. But he did, forsaking 
a narrow federalist approach for a broader individual rights approach. 
He did not have to reach the issue of harm to children, which was not 
directly at issue in Windsor, but he did, flipping the script on equal 
marriage opponents who have historically tried to justify same-sex 
marriage bans in the name of protecting children. Anticipatorily 
rebutting such arguments that might occur in a future marriage case, 
Kennedy poignantly points out in the Windsor majority opinion that 
marriage recognition denials result in “humiliat[ing] tens of thousands 
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of children now being raised by same-sex couples”172 and that DOMA 
“makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other 
families in their community and in their daily lives.”173 And in listing 
DOMA’s harms, Kennedy included those harms suffered by children 
of same-sex couples denied marriage rights, such as the harm resulting 
from the statute’s message to “all persons with whom same-sex 
couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is 
less worthy than the marriages of others.”174 
Finally, while Windsor’s immediate holding was limited to those 
same-sex marriages performed in states allowing same-sex marriage, 
this does not preclude its later extension to cases involving the right 
of same-sex couples in all states to marry. As Justice Scalia  
helpfully offers: 
In my opinion, however, the view that this Court will take 
of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond 
mistaking by today’s opinion. As I have said, the real rationale 
of today’s opinion, whatever disappearing trail of its legalistic 
argle-bargle one chooses to follow, is that DOMA is motivated 
by “‘bare . . . desire to harm’” couples in same-sex marriages. 
Supra, at 2691. How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to reach 
the same conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-sex 
couples marital status. Consider how easy (inevitable) it is to 
make the following substitutions in a passage from today’s 
opinion ante, at 2694: 
 
“DOMA’s This state law’s principal effect is to identify a subset 
of state-sanctioned marriages constitutionally protected sexual 
relationships, see Lawrence, and make them unequal. The 
principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons 
like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, 
enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And DOMA 
this state law contrives to deprive some couples married under 
the laws of their State enjoying constitutionally protected sexual 
relationships, but not other couples, of both rights and 
responsibilities.”175 
As an additional example of things not being quite what they 
seem, there is some true irony in Justice Scalia, who appears to be the 
 
172. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 2696 (emphasis added). 
175. Id. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting id. 
at 2691, 2693 (majority opinion)).  
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Justice most vehemently opposed to same-sex marriage, being the one 
to spell out most clearly how Windsor provides the clear precedent for 
a future decision striking down state laws banning same-sex marriage. 
There is also reciprocal irony in Justice Kennedy, the Justice most 
likely to author that future opinion recognizing individual rights of 
LGBT citizens to marry the person of their choice, having yet to own 
that all of the Court’s recent LGBT rights opinions—authored by 
him—build the solid, undeniable foundation for that future decision. 
Strange ducks though the Justices may at times appear,176 they are 
ultimately human, with motivations that can only be surmised by 
Court-watchers; we will never know for certain what prompts them to 
adjudicate in the sometimes less-than-straightforward way that  
they do.  
One can only conjecture what Justice Scalia’s motive is in 
handing marriage equality proponents the wording of a future 
marriage equality decision on a silver platter.177 In the end, he is right 
about Windsor: it is not a federalist decision but is, rather, a powerful 
individual rights–based precedent for a future marriage equality 
affirmation. When Justice Scalia’s illustrative dissents spelling out the 
path toward future marriage equality decisions are read in 
conjunction with the Court’s previous declaration in Lawrence that 
“[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect 
 
176. Justice Scalia has even, in an admittedly entirely different context, 
literally quacked like a duck. In 2004, while defending his decision not to 
recuse himself from a case involving former Vice President Dick Cheney, 
with whom Scalia is a friend and duck hunting partner, Scalia stated to 
a college audience with his trademark defiant wit, “[The case] did not 
involve a lawsuit against Dick Cheney as a private individual, . . . This 
was a government issue. It’s acceptable practice to socialize with 
executive branch officials when there are not personal claims against 
them. That’s all I’m going to say for now. Quack, quack.” See Dan 
Collins, Justice Scalia Defends Cheney Trip, AP (March 18, 
2004, 10:35 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-defends-
cheney-trip/ (emphasis added). 
177. Allow one last cynical conjecture about veiled meanings of judicial 
statements: Scalia’s emphasis of “this” in his statement that “the view 
that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is 
indicated beyond mistaking by today’s opinion” may betray his view of 
the Court as little more than a political entity, governed by the political 
bent of its majority members. If this is a fair reading, it demonstrates 
his intent to use his dissents as lobbying tools, to the extent they signal 
to the voters the need to change the Court from “this” Court to a new 
Court. With this cynical lens held to Scalia’s dissents in LGBT rights 
cases, it may explain his pattern of spelling out how the opinions he is 
dissenting from will likely lead to a future same-sex marriage equality 
opinion. He does so not to help those Justices accomplish the result he 
appears to abhor but to point out to others the danger of such a result 
happening. His audience is not the Court, or even lower courts, but, 
rather, a certain ilk of American voters. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise 
1117 
for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are 
linked in important respects,”178 one can easily envision a future 
opinion citing Lawrence and Windsor to affirm equal marriage rights. 
Such an opinion built on past equal liberty cases might, for example, 
conclude that the “right to demand respect” and equal treatment 
under law includes a right of all same-sex couples, not just those 
already legally married, to demand respect in the form of equal 
marriage rights.  
Whatever exact form the final swan song for marriage inequality 
takes, it will surely be one that rejects any raised federalist claim, 
whether minimalist-inspired or otherwise, based on the alleged power 
of states to deny same-sex marriage rights. In that inevitable decision 
affirming same-sex marriage equality for once and for all, the Court 
will rise above the hollow minimalism of the past to offer a new 
optimistic model for the critical and necessary role of judicial review 
in protecting freedom from governmental discrimination in the equal 
protection of our most intimate life partnerships and families. 
 
178. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (emphasis added). 
